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ALASKA'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY TEN YEARS
AFTER RAVIN V STATE: DEVELOPING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF PRIVACY
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.
Alaska Constitution, article I, section 22.1
With these words, Alaska became one of the first states in the
United States to explicitly recognize the right to privacy in its consti-
tution.2 Previously, the existence of the right as a constitutional prin-
ciple had to be inferred from the "penumbras" of the United States
Constitution3 and the Alaska Constitution.4 The explicit recognition
of this right in the Alaska Constitution enables the judiciary and the
legislature to protect Alaskans from intrusion into their private lives.
The ability of the Alaska courts and legislature to respond to threats
to privacy is especially significant today because of the increased
information-gathering capacity of both government and business.5
Copyright © 1985 by Alaska Law Review
1. Approved Aug. 22, 1972.
2. For similar constitutional provisions see ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23; HAWAII CONsT. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 6; LA. CONsT. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 10; VASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
3. The penumbra theory was first announced in Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479
(1965). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Griswold, held that the right to mari-
tal privacy protected married couples who use contraceptives and doctors who advise
couples on their use. Id. at 485-86. The right of marital privacy was found in the
"penumbras" of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id. at 484. Jus-
tice Goldberg, in concurrence, preferred to base the right to marital privacy solely on
the ninth amendment. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
4. In Alaska, the right to privacy was initially implied from the term "liberty" in
article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution, which provides a list of inherent rights
enjoyed by all persons. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972). For a
discussion of the Breese case, see infra text accompanying notes 48-53.
5. The term "Information Age" has been used to describe the current post-
industrial era in the United States and other technologically advanced nations. Mc-
Guire, The Information Age: An Introduction to Transborder Data Flow, 20
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1979-80) (quoting Senator George McGovern, then Chairman of
the Subcomm. on International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions).
The increase in the information-gathering capacity of government and business is
due to technological advances in the field of computers and electronics which make it
easier to gather and store large amounts of information. Concern about the effect of
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In the first major Alaska Supreme Court case interpreting the pri-
vacy amendment, Ravin v. State,6 the court struck down a statute that
criminalized possession of marijuana in the home for personal use. 7
The court held that, given the fundamental nature of the right to pri-
vacy in the home8 and the limited potential for societal harm posed by
using small amounts of marijuana in the home, the state failed to
demonstrate a sufficient justification for criminalizing such
possession. 9
Several decisions interpreting the right to privacy amendment
have been issued by the Alaska Supreme Court since Ravin was de-
cided. These decisions represent the Alaska Supreme Court's first at-
tempt to develop a jurisprudence of privacy. No fully independent
jurisprudence of the privacy amendment has developed, however, be-
cause the courts have proceeded largely on a case-by-case basis, link-
ing the right to privacy with other constitutional interests and
borrowing standards from other constitutional guarantees. The
court's failure to develop an independent analytical approach to the
privacy issue has resulted in inconsistent treatment of the right in the
variety of contexts in which the amendment has been invoked.
The justification for the adoption of a separate privacy amend-
ment is undermined by the lack of an independent privacy jurispru-
dence. 10 At times, the privacy amendment has been used as a
justification for a broad reading of other constitutional provisions.
Although those applications of the privacy amendment are correct ap-
the Information Age has been evidenced by Congress in its findings in support of the
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1982)). Congress found, among other things, that
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information techno-
logy, while essential to the efficient operations of the Government, has
greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any
collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of personal information.
Id.
In the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress attempted to safeguard the privacy of infor-
mation gathered by government agencies by restricting access to such personal data
and by providing for inspection of files by the subject of those files. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b) (1982). The Act has failed to achieve its aims. See Privacy in the U.S. Is an
Illusion: Report, 63 A.B.A. J. 1363 (1977) (article on the report of the Privacy Protec-
tion Study Commission). For other descriptions of these threats, see WESTIN, PRI-
VACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Privacy in Peril: Technology and Government Erode
Protections, 69 A.B.A. J. 565 (1983); Note, The Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of
Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 VAND. L. REV. 139 (1983); and
material cited therein.
6. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
7. ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.010 (1975) (repealed 1982).
8. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
9. Id. at 511. The court held that the state must show that an actual threat to
public health or welfare would exist without the challenged governmental control.
10. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 879 (Alaska 1978).
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plications, they should not be the sole effect of the amendment's adop-
tion. If the sole purpose of the privacy amendment is to justify a
broad reading of other constitutional provisions, then the amendment
is superfluous, 1I for such broad readings could be achieved under pre-
privacy-amendment precedent.12 If, on the other hand, the privacy
amendment is to have an independent status, then the development of
a distinct jurisprudence of privacy is necessary.
Although this process has begun, in some areas in which the
court could have employed a separate privacy analysis, the court has
preferred instead to use the privacy amendment to influence the con-
ventional analysis. Foremost among these areas is search and
seizure.13 This note attempts to identify the themes running through
the Alaska privacy decisions and suggests that a unifying analysis em-
ploying a sliding scale test14 be adopted for use in all cases raising
constitutional privacy issues.
The sliding scale test is essentially a balancing test. The test
weighs the individual's interest in privacy against the state's justifica-
tion for the infringement of that right. The state interest which can
overcome the individual privacy interest varies with the strength of the
individual interest.15 Thus, as the privacy interest grows stronger, the
burden on the government to justify its intrusion on the right becomes
greater. 16
The note first discusses the background of the right to privacy in
both the federal and state courts. Then, specific Alaska decisions are
examined in order to isolate the tests which the Alaska courts have
applied in interpreting the privacy amendment and to establish the
basis for a unifying test. This discussion will focus on developments in
the following areas: general personal and place privacy, informational
privacy, and search and seizure. 17 Finally, the note compares the tests
11. Id.
12. For a discussion of how the same results could be achieved under pre-privacy
amendment precedent as under the privacy amendment, see infra note 128.
13. The need for and consequences of recognizing the independent significance of
the privacy amendment in the search and seizure context are discussed infra notes
127-41 and accompanying text.
14. The sliding scale test was advocated by Justice Boochever. See Woods &
Rohde, Inc. v. State Dep't. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 153-54 (Alaska 1977) (Boochever,
J., concurring); Ravin, 537 P.2d at 515-16 (Boochever, J., concurring).
15. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 515 (Boochever, J., concurring).
16. Id.
17. The right to privacy has a potential impact on almost every area of the law,
and a thorough treatment of all the implications of the privacy amendment would be
well beyond the scope of this note. Accordingly, three litigated areas are examined in
the note. The first category, general personal and place privacy, is meant as an all-
embracing category for cases concerned with the meaning of the "fundamental right
of privacy." See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504. The principles derived from the cases in
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which have been used and advocates the adoption of the sliding scale
test to provide a consistent privacy analysis in all cases in which the
privacy amendment is involved.
II. ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Federal Law: Inferring the Right to Privacy
Throughout most of the history of federal constitutional law, the
right to privacy was not even implicitly recognized. The most famous
opinion dealing with the right to privacy in the first century and a half
of United States Supreme Court history was Justice Brandeis's dissent
in Olmstead v. United States in 1928.13 Justice Brandeis argued that
the protection provided by the fourth amendment against unreason-
able searches and seizures was intended to reach not only physical
tampering with property by the government, but also invasions of per-
sonal privacy, :such as wiretapping, which did not involve physical
penetration of protected space. Justice Brandeis described this funda-
mental right as "the right to be let alone." 19 The other Justices, how-
ever, continued to support the belief that the fourth amendment
protected individuals only against unreasonable searches and seizures
that physically intrude into protected space.20
After Olmstead, the right to privacy was not explicitly addressed
until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut.21 Several decisions based on
other rights, however, recognized elements of the right to privacy. 22
These decisions included cases protecting "associational privacy,"'23
the right to privacy in one's home,24 and the right to decide how one's
children are to be educated.25 The privacy interest acknowledged in
these areas are intended to be applicable in other areas of the law touching upon the
privacy issue.
18. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 478. This phrase was made famous by Warren and Brandeis in an 1890
article on the right to privacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890). In their article, the writers advocated the recognition of a common
law cause of action for the invasion of privacy.
20. 277 U.S. at 465.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. See Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate De-
cision, 64 CAL. L. Rnv. 1447 (1976). Cf Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right
Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153 (1972) (discussing the clash between
speech and free press rights and an individual right to privacy).
23. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (statute requiring a civil rights or-
ganization to provide membership lists held unconstitutional because of potential har-
assment and resulting chill to free speech and assembly interest).
24. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (right to privacy in the home pro-
vides government justification for prohibiting a form of commercial speech, door-to-
door sales).
25. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring attendance at
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each of these cases was not recognized as an independent interest, but
was held to be necessary to the exercise of an explicit right.
The United States Supreme Court finally recognized the existence
of a constitutionally protected right to privacy in Griswold.26 The
"fundamental" privacy right involved in Griswold was the right of
marital privacy.27 The Court did not find this right in any specific
amendment, but in the "penumbras" of a number of amendments.28
Marital privacy is one component of the "liberty" protected from state
encroachment by the fourteenth amendment.2
9
Since Griswold, the Supreme Court has struggled to define the
scope of this federal right to privacy. Of the many privacy decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court in the last two decades, three
have been of particular significance for Alaska constitutional law.
30
These three cases have formed the basis for many of Alaska's privacy
decisions.31
Katz v. United States32 was the search and seizure case which in-
troduced a privacy component into fourth amendment analysis. The
case involved a challenge to the admissibility of evidence gained
through a warrantless wiretapping of a public telephone booth. The
majority held that, even though the government had not physically
invaded the zone of privacy in the booth, the wiretap itself was uncon-
stitutional without a warrant33 because of the expectation of privacy
one has when the door to the telephone booth is closed. Even more
significant than the majority opinion, however, was Justice Harlan's
concurrence. Justice Harlan laid out a test to determine when an ex-
pectation of privacy will be protected under the fourth amendment.
34
The Alaska Supreme Court later adopted this test as its own for cases
interpreting the Alaska counterpart to the fourth amendment.
35
The test asks two questions. First, did the subject of the search
exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy? Second, is this
subjective expectation one which society is willing to recognize as rea-
sonable? If the subjective expectation of privacy is reasonable, then a
public schools held unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference with the "liberty"
of parents to raise their children as they please).
26. 381 U.S. at 484.
27. Id. at 486.
28. Id.; see also supra note 3.
29. 381 U.S. at 481-82.
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498-500 (Alaska 1975).
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33. Id. at 358-59. In so holding, the Court overturned its decision in Olmstead v.
United States. Id. at 353.
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 875 (Alaska 1978).
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governmental encroachment upon this privacy interest without a
search warrant is presumed to be unreasonable and must be justified
by exigent circumstances. 36
The second Supreme Court case with particular significance for
Alaska privacy law is Stanley v. Georgia.37 In Stanley, the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance which criminalized in-home posses-
sion of pornographic materials for personal use. In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court emphasized the privacy of the home.38 The decision
was based on the first amendment "right to receive information and
ideas,"' 39 but the Court recognized that the privacy interest means the
first amendment right "takes on an added dimension. ' 40 The ac-
knowledgement by the Stanley Court of the privacy of the home pro-
vided the basis for the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Ravin v.
State.41
The third federal privacy case which has had significant impact
on the development of Alaska law is Roe v. Wade,42 in which the
Supreme Court held that the states could not constitutionally prohibit
abortions except in the third trimester of pregnancy. The decision was
based on a woman's right to privacy in her decision concerning
whether or not to have children.43 This privacy right is related to the
marital right to decide whether or not to use contraceptives which was
involved in Griswold. Both rights emerge from the privacy interest in
the family and in procreation. The Alaska Supreme Court has charac-
terized these privacy rights as part of an even more general right of
"personal autonomy in relation to choices affecting an individual's
personal life." 44
36. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. The United States Supreme Court has drastically cut
back on previous privacy decisions in the search and seizure area. For example, the
Court has approved of warrantless recording of conversations between a suspect and a
consenting informant, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), and the warrant-
less use of an electronic tracking device placed in a car trunk, United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983). Decisions such as these have led to an increasing willingness on
the part of the state high courts to liberally interpret their own constitutions in order
to compensate for the federal retreat from the protection of the privacy of individuals.
See Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism among State Supreme Courts,
33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1982); see also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). With a separate privacy
amendment in place, Alaska is particularly able to respond to the increasing need to
protect individuals' privacy. See Glass, 583 P.2d at 875.
37. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
38. See id. at 564.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Id. at 153.
44. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 500.
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The three cases just discussed are important, not only because
they have been cited as persuasive authority by the Alaska Supreme
Court in defining the right to privacy, but also because they illustrate
different types of privacy analysis. The Katz approach finds a right to
privacy implicit in the text of a constitutional amendment and em-
ploys a test of societal reasonableness in defining the parameters of
that right. Stanley also finds an implicit right to privacy but ties this
right to a fundamental right and therefore allows encroachment upon
these rights only upon a showing of a compelling state interest. Fi-
nally, Roe recognizes a right to privacy which is itself fundamental.
Invasions of this fundamental right to privacy must be judged by the
compelling state interest standard.
The diversity of approaches to privacy questions in the federal
courts is mirrored in Alaska case law. Such a variety of analyses
seems unnecessary in a state where an explicit textual basis for the
right to privacy exists. Alaska courts continue, however, to apply at
least two different analytical approaches: one for search and seizure
cases4 5 and a second for other privacy cases. 46
B. State Law Origins: Incorporating the Federal Precedent
Prior to the adoption of the privacy amendment in 1972, Alaska
courts rarely considered the right to privacy. Since so little Alaska
precedent exists, it is difficult to determine the status of the right to
privacy before the adoption of the amendment. The only conclusion
that can safely be drawn is that the Alaska pre-amendment right to
privacy was at least as broad as the federal right.47
The only major pre-amendment privacy case decided by the
Alaska Supreme Court is Breese v. Smith,48 which involved a chal-
lenge by a student to a school hair length limitation. A federal penum-
bral privacy argument was presented, but the court did not decide the
case on those grounds. The court explained that there was disagree-
ment over the federal issue among various state and federal courts and
45. The search and seizure cases employ the Katz societal reasonableness formula
but the privacy amendment is used, as in Stanley, to justify a broader reading of the
test. The effects of the test employed by the Alaska Supreme Court in the search and
seizure area are discussed infra text accompanying notes 116-23.
46. The Roe type of analysis has been used in general privacy cases like Ravin.
General privacy cases are discussed infra text accompanying notes 66-104.
47. This result is mandated by the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.1. Any state decision granting less protection than the federal
Constitution would in effect invalidate the federal protections and thus conflict with
the supremacy clause. An interesting question is whether, if a decision like Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 113, were overturned, the privacy amendment would require the
Alaska courts to follow the overturned precedent.
48. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
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that the United States Supreme Court had refused to decide the is-
sue.49 The Alaska court then proceeded to strike down the hair length
limitation on state law grounds. The court based its decision on the
right to liberty guaranteed in article I, section 1 of the Alaska Consti-
tution and on the right to a public education guaranteed by article
VII, section 1.50 The court articulated its liberty rationale in privacy
terms. It stated that personal appearance was constitutionally pro-
tected as a fundamental right. This right was described as being part
of a broader concept - the notion of personal immunity from govern-
mental control or the right "to be let alone."51 The right to be let
alone is at the core of the concept of liberty.5 2 The court then applied
a compelling state interest test to the hair length restriction. Since the
court was unable to find a compelling state interest, the school regula-
tion was struck down.53
Two statements made by the Breese court have had significant
influence on the development of the right to privacy in Alaska. First,
the court noted that the state courts were not limited by federal prece-
dent when construing similarly-worded Alaska constitutional provi-
sions. States have a duty to "move forward" and interpret state
provisions more broadly than their federal counterparts.5 4 Moreover,
the court recognized a judicial duty to develop additional rights not
recognized under the federal Constitution.5 5 These two statements
continue to provide a significant foundation for an extension of the
Alaska constitutional right to privacy beyond the limits set by federal
precedent.
The 1975 decision in Ravin was the first major decision to con-
strue the privacy amendment, which was adopted in 1972. In the dec-
ade following Ravin, developments in two specific areas of the law
show that a jurisprudence of privacy is beginning to take shape in
Alaska, although as yet it is without a unifying theme.
49. Id. at 167. The United States Supreme Court, however, subsequently decided
the issue in favor of the validity of hair length restrictions, at least with regard to
public servants. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (police officer).
50. Breese, 501 P.2d at 166-67.
51. Id. (quoting COOLEY ON TORTS, cited in Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891). This is the origin of the phrase used by Warren and Brandeis. See
supra note 19.).
52. Breese, 501 P.2d at 168.
53. Id. at 174.
54. Id. at 167 n.30 (citing Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401 (Alaska
1970)).
55. Breese, 501 P.2d at 169 n.43 (citing Baker, 471 P.2d at 402).
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III. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS: 1975-1984
A. Introduction
To understand the developments in privacy jurisprudence, one
must recognize the distinction between two types of privacy rights -
personal privacy rights and place privacy rights.5 6 Place privacy
rights protect a privacy interest in a place itself.5 7 Personal privacy
rights, on the other hand, protect some inherent "personal autonomy"
right58 or a relational interest like the marital privacy mentioned in
Griswold. 59 These rights exist regardless of where they are exercised.
Future issues are more likely to arise in the personal privacy arena
because the boundaries of place privacy are well defined while the
boundaries of personal privacy are indefinite.60
The home is the only place in which a fundamental right to pri-
56. The distinction between place and personal privacy analyses was made by
Chief Justice Burger in his opinion for the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973). He contrasted the "protection afforded by Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), [which] is restricted to a place, the home," 413 U.S. at 66 n.13, with
the "constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation,
and child rearing, [which involve] a protected intimate relationship." Id. This dis-
tinction was utilized in a right to privacy article on Ravin. Note, Ravin v. State: A
Case for Privacy and Possession of Pot, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. Rnv. 178, 201-04, 218-
19 (1975). For another attempt to break privacy into component parts see Comment,
supra note 22.
57. This right is the primary privacy conception which has been used in search
and seizure analysis. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
58. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 500 and Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972) (right
in one's own hairstyle), are examples of cases involving personal privacy rights.
59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60. In both federal and state courts, place privacy has largely become syno-
nomous with the privacy of the home. For instance, the holding in Stanley was
sharply limited to the home by a series of later Supreme Court decisions. In United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting
the mailing of obscene material, even when the material was mailed only to consenting
adults; and in United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971),
the Court upheld a statute criminalizing the importation of obscene material for both
commercial distribution and personal use. Chief Justice Burger later characterized
Stanley as "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.'" Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 66.
In Alaska, the protection Ravin afforded marijuana users was strictly confined to
the home. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; see also ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.71.060(1) & (2) (1983) (possession of one ounce of marijuana in public or any
amount in a motor vehicle criminalized). The range of activity that is protected in the
home is also sharply limited. Marijuana remains the only controlled substance that
can legally be possessed in the home without a prescription. See State v. Erickson, 594
P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978) (possession of cocaine in the home for personal use not protected
by privacy amendment). The court has also refused to extend Ravin to cover sexual
conduct of children in the home. Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1977). The
court in Anderson avoided a decision on whether the right to privacy protects certain
acts between consenting adults within the privacy of the home. Id. at 358.
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vacy is recognized. 61 This fundamental right was the basis for the
Ravin holding.62 Thus, the protection provided by Ravin is largely
ineffectual outside the home. In Belgarde v. State, the court refused to
extend the Ravin holding to decriminalize the possession in a public
place of small amounts of marijuana intended for personal use.63
The two areas of significant development after the right to pri-
vacy amendment was adopted are general privacy64 and privacy
within the search and seizure context. 65 General privacy cases involve
both personal and place privacy concepts, while search and seizure
cases have focused primarily on place privacy concepts. Judicial de-
velopments in each of these areas center around the refinement of ba-
sic principles unique to that particular area. As a result, a bifurcated
analysis of the right to privacy is emerging, with one test for search
and seizure cases and another test for general privacy cases. This bi-
furcation is unnecessary. A unified test that would encompass the en-
tire spectrum of privacy cases could be employed by the Alaska
courts.
B. General Right to Privacy
1. Developing the tests. Since the adoption of the privacy amend-
ment, the Alaska Supreme Court has used three different methods of
analyzing general privacy claims. In Gray v. State, 66 the court adopted
the "compelling state interest" test. Under this test, any time a funda-
mental right is infringed by the state, the state must justify the in-
fringement by a single standard - the infringement must be necessary
to further a compelling state interest. Gray involved a challenge to the
marijuana statute which was later held unconstitutional as applied in
Ravin. 67 The Gray court held that the right to privacy encompassed
the right to ingest "food, beverage, or other substances. '68 The court
remanded the case, however, for a determination of whether the state's
61. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
62. Id.
63. 543 P.2d 206 (Alaska 1975). Thus, a person can legally possess marijuana but
cannot legally obtain that marijuana for personal use in the home. This situation is
analogous to the result reached in Stanley and Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs by the
United States Supreme Court in the pornography area. A person can legally possess
obscene materials but cannot legally purchase them for personal use in the home.
Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. at 381 (Black, J., dissenting).
64. The right of informational privacy is a subset of general privacy. Because of
the importance of the informational privacy cases, both as examples of the application
of the test evolving in personal privacy cases and as examples of issues likely to con-
front the courts in the future, these cases are treated separately.
65. See supra note 17.
66. 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 528.
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interest was compelling where marijuana is concerned. Before the
Gray dispute returned to the supreme court, the court held in Ravin
that the state's interest in preventing possession of marijuana in the
home for personal use was not compelling. 69
The method of analysis used by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Ravin was the "important governmental interest" test. This test was
adopted by the court as a less rigid alternative to the compelling state
interest test.70 Under this test, if the government interferes with an
individual's right to privacy, then the government must show that this
interference furthered an important governmental interest and that the
means chosen to carry out the governmental interest bore a close and
substantial relationship to that interest. The court undertook an ex-
tensive review of scientific and sociological data concerning the effects
of marijuana use. It concluded that the potential harm to the public
from marijuana use was not great enough to present a close and sub-
stantial relationship between public welfare and control of marijuana
possession and use in the home. 71
In State v. Erickson,72 the Alaska Supreme Court used the "slid-
ing scale" test to analyze the asserted privacy right to ingest cocaine in
the home.73 The sliding scale test compares the infringing government
conduct with the privacy interest in question. The more fundamental
the privacy right, the greater the burden that is put on the state to
show "the relationship of the intrusion to a legitimate governmental
interest."' 74 In Erickson, the privacy interest was the same as in Ravin
- the right to use controlled substances in the home. Nevertheless,
the state intrusion in Erickson was upheld. The distinction made by
the court was based on the nature of the relative effects of cocaine and
marijuana on users of the drugs. Employing extensive scientific and
sociological data, the court concluded that use of cocaine, even in
small amounts in the home, presented a greater danger of harm to
society than marijuana use.75 The court noted that a fundamental per-
sonal right "must yield when it interferes in a serious manner with the
health, safety, rights and privileges of others or with the public wel-
fare."' 76 Therefore, the court found that the right to ingest cocaine in
69. 537 P.2d at 511.
70. Id. at 498.
71. Id. at 511.
72. 574 P.2d I (Alaska 1978).
73. The sliding scale test was advocated by Justice Boochever in Ravin, 537 P.2d
at 515 (Boochever, J., concurring), and in Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State Dep't. of
Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 153 (Alaska 1977) (Boochever, J., concurring).
74. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 515 (Boochever, J., concurring).
75. 574 P.2d at 21-22 & n.144.
76. Id. at 21 (quoting Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504).
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one's home must yield to the state interest in protecting the public
welfare.77
The Alaska Supreme Court's use of three different tests for decid-
ing the privacy issue underscores the lack of consistency and predict-
ability existing at present in Alaska's jurisprudence of privacy. The
court does appear, however, to be moving toward acceptance of the
sliding scale test used by the majority in Erickson. This movement has
occurred primarily in cases involving personal privacy concepts rather
than place privacy rights,78 especially in the cases which consider the
right of informational privacy.79
2. Informational privacy: the emerging sliding scale test. Several
types of personal privacy rights have been explored by the courts, in-
cluding the right to keep personal information private.80 In analyzing
informational privacy cases, the Alaska Supreme Court seems to apply
77. In his concurrence, Justice Matthews expressed concern about the majority's
use of the sliding scale test. Justice Matthews believed that the sliding scale test failed
to define the precise privacy right at stake, and that a definition of the specific right
was necessary to give the privacy amendment "the life it deserves." 574 P.2d at 23.
He argued that the majority's approach assumed the existence of a protected privacy
interest, and then "balance[d] it away" when "confronted with a reasonable statute."
Id. at 21-22. The approach advocated by Justice Matthews emphasizes the definition
of the privacy interest at stake. The Ravin court had characterized the privacy inter-
est as "the general proposition that the authority of the state to exert control over the
individual extends only to activities of the individual which affect others or the public
at large as it relates to matters of public health or safety, or to provide for the general
welfare." Id. at 21 (quoting Ravin, 537 P.2d at 509). According to Justice Matthews,
if the activity at issue falls within the sphere of the state's authority because it relates
to matters of public health, safety, or the general welfare, then the activity is not
protected by the right to privacy. The individual's activity in Erickson, cocaine use,
did not fall within the right to privacy because the anti-social behavior that may ac-
company it falls within the sphere of the state's authority. Thus, the privacy amend-
ment offered no protection to Erickson for his cocaine use under Justice Matthews's
test, even when this activity was confined to the home.
78. The distinction between personal privacy and place privacy is discussed supra
notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
80. Another personal privacy area in which there has been a good deal of activity
has been in the definition of children's fundamental privacy rights. Generally, less
protection has been given to children's privacy rights than to those of adults because
the state has a greater interest in regulating the conduct of children than of adults.
Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351, 358 (Alaska 1977). This is especially true with re-
spect to the sexual conduct of children. Id.; see also L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827
(Alaska 1976) (The court identified distinct government interests with reference to
children in upholding Alaska's Children in Need of Aid statute, ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.010 (1977).). Children have also received less protection in the search and
seizure area, whether place privacy or personal privacy is involved. The court has
held valid against a privacy challenge a search of the person of a student where the
search is conducted by a school official pursuant to properly enacted regulations
within the common law privilege to discipline. D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1982).
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a sliding scale test, although the court often describes its approach in
words that suggest the application of the compelling state interest test.
A decision which clearly illustrates the application of the sliding
scale analysis is Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission.81 In Fal-
con, a physician member of a school board challenged a requirement
under the Alaska Conflict of Interest Law8 2 that he furnish a list of all
patients with whom he had done more than $100 worth of business
during the previous year. The court held that Falcon did not have a
personal privacy interest in the disclosure, but he was allowed to assert
his patients' right to privacy, even though the doctor-patient privilege
did not protect the information.8 3
The court's analysis in Falcon began with a determination of the
nature of the privacy interest involved.84 The privacy interest, which
arose in the context of the doctor-patient relationship, was the interest
in not having one's identity revealed where such a revelation discloses
personal information. Next, the court applied a level of scrutiny ap-
propriate to that interest. To justify interference with the doctor-
patient relationship, the state had to show "'a fair and substantial re-
lation' between the statutory means and a legitimate governmental
purpose." s The court then balanced the "nature and the extent of the
privacy invasion and the strength of the state interest requiring disclo-
sure"8 6 in order to determine the validity of the state's action. In per-
forming the balancing, the court examined the interest of the state in
promoting fair and honest government and weighed that interest
against the patients' interest in concealing their identity as patients of
this doctor.87 Because the state regulation provided a potential for
revealing sensitive information without a procedure for screening out
patients who would be harmed by such disclosure, the operation of the
disclosure law was suspended until procedural safeguards were
introduced.
An example of an informational privacy case in which the Alaska
Supreme Court described its approach as an application of the compel-
81. 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
82. ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.50.010 -.200 (1983).
83. Falcon, 570 P.2d at 475.
84. "Under the Alaska Constitution, the required level of justification turns on
the precise nature of the privacy interest involved." Id. at 476
85. Id. (citing Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 363 (Alaska 1976)).
86. Falcon, 570 P.2d at 476.
87. Id. at 480. The court noted that, in the usual case, revealing that someone
had seen a doctor would not be regarded as a revelation of very sensitive material. In
certain cases, however, the mere fact that the patient had been seeing a doctor or a
particular doctor could amount to revelation of a sensitive matter. This would be the
case where the doctor specializes in contraceptive matters or performs many abor-
tions, or in the case where one spouse sees a doctor without the other's knowledge. Id.
at 479-80.
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ling state interest test but which more closely resembles a sliding scale
analysis is Messerli v. State. 88 This case involved a challenge to a cam-
paign disclosure law which required anyone advertising in a political
campaign to file a disclosure statement with the State Election Com-
mission. The court applied a compelling interest test 89 but the opinion
is not inconsistent with the sliding scale analysis used in Falcon. The
state intrusion in Messerli infringed not only on privacy rights but also
on free speech and free press rights. In combination, these rights un-
questionably require a compelling state interest to justify an intrusion
upon them.90 Nevertheless, in support of the proposition that the
right to privacy is not absolute, the Messerli court cited the Falcon
court's statement that the level of justification depends on the nature
of the privacy interest involved.91 Thus, Messerli can be read as sim-
ply focusing on that segment of the sliding scale that requires a com-
pelling state interest.
Another case which illustrates the Alaska Supreme Court's use of
a compelling interest test which is in substance one end of the sliding
scale test is State v. Oliver.92 Oliver was the first Alaska case raising
the right to privacy as a defense for failure to file a tax return. The
taxpayer argued that the right to privacy prevented the state from re-
quiring him to submit his federal W-2 forms and other employer-
generated records to the state for computation of his state income tax.
The Oliver court rejected the privacy claim. 93
The court noted, and the state conceded, that the personal finan-
cial information to be disclosed was within the zone of privacy pro-
tected by the privacy amendment.94 Then the court applied a
compelling interest test to the furnishing of information required by
the tax statute. The court held that the implementation of a tax sys-
tem was a compelling interest.95 The court noted that at best a tenu-
ous connection existed between the information contained in W-2
forms and "a person's more intimate concerns," 96 and that the dis-
closed information was to be kept confidential. 97 Therefore, the state's
88. 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980).
89. Id. at 86.
90. See supra cases cited notes 23-25.
91. 626 P.2d at 86 (citing Falcon, 570 P.2d at 476).
92. 636 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1981).
93. Id. at 1167. The taxpayer's self-incrimination argument was also rejected. Id.
at 1160. Federal courts have rejected similar claims based on the federal right to
privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1220 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977).
94. Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1166 (citing State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 878-79 (Alaska
1978)).
95. Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1166.
96. Id. at 1167.
97. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 43.05.230 (1983).
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interest outweighed the intrusion on the taxpayer's privacy. The court
then held that self-disclosure of such information was the least intru-
sive means for the state to secure the information.98
Despite the court's explicit use of a compelling state interest stan-
dard in Oliver, a careful reading of the case reveals that the court actu-
ally applied a sliding scale analysis. The application of the sliding
scale test is evident in several statements in the Oliver opinion. One
indication that the court was applying the sliding scale analysis is the
court's use of the Falcon language regarding the need for a balancing
of interests.99 Such a balancing is inconsistent with traditional com-
pelling state interest analysis. Traditional compelling state interest
analysis is an all-or-nothing type of analysis. There is no weighing of
interests. 100 If the right is fundamental, the state must show a compel-
ling state interest to justify infringement of that right. This is a very
high standard for the government to meet. In fact, very few laws will
pass such a test.10 1 If the right is not fundamental, any infringing law
which has a rational basis in fact is valid. Under this standard, almost
no law will fall. In practice, therefore, the determination of whether
or not a right is fundamental is the end of the inquiry. In Oliver, how-
ever, the determination that a fundamental right was involved did not
end the analysis. The state's interest in the implementation of an in-
come tax was found to be compelling and then it was weighed against
the privacy interest in non-disclosure.102 A further indication of the
court's balancing approach appears in the court's expression of "grave
doubts" about the permissibility of requiring production of "purely
private" papers, even if necessary to the state's compelling interest in
collecting revenue.10 3 Such statements represent a more precise fit
98. Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1167.
99. Id. at 1166.
100. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974).
101. The United States Supreme Court has found a compelling interest sufficient to
justify government intrusion into fundamental rights in only one case, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and this result can be explained as the Court
giving in to wartime pressures in upholding the Japanese internment scheme under-
taken in World War II. Korematsu was the case in which the compelling interest test
was first announced. Id. at 216. The Alaska Supreme Court has had only a few occa-
sions to apply this test and has found a compelling state interest to be present in
Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1167, and in Schultz v. State, 593 P.2d 640, 642 (Alaska 1979),
which involved the search of a burning house by a fire inspector. See also Pharr v.
Fairbanks-North Star Borough, 638 P.2d 666, 670 (Alaska 1981), which followed
Oliver.
102. Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1167.
103. Id. These statements seem to indicate a pro-taxpayer viewpoint. In the only
reported tax case citing Oliver, however, the privacy argument again lost to the reve-
nue interests of local government. Pharr, 638 P.2d 666. Nevertheless, this case was
not a cutback on the court's rationale in Oliver. It involved sales tax records already
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with a sliding scale analysis than with the less flexible compelling state
interest analysis.
The argument for the non-disclosure of "purely private informa-
tion" is applicable to state regulations outside the tax area. The lan-
guage in Oliver does not limit the holding to the State Department of
Revenue. Given the form of the sliding scale test applied in Oliver,
there is no reason why other governmental agencies should not have to
satisfy the same compelling interest standard for gaining access to per-
sonal financial information that the Department of Revenue must
satisfy. 04
C. Search and Seizure: Nonrecognition of the Independence of the
Privacy Amendment
Although the bulk of the case law interpreting the privacy
amendment has been in the area of searches and seizures, the court has
not even begun to provide an independent privacy analysis for the
search and seizure cases. An examination of the case law demon-
strates that the privacy amendment can be given independent signifi-
cance in this area, as in other areas.
The preeminent Alaska privacy case in the area of search and
seizure is State v. Glass. 105 In Glass, the Alaska Supreme Court in-
voked the privacy amendment and suppressed evidence gained by
means of warrantless monitoring of a conversation between the ac-
cused and an informant wearing a wireless transmitter. Although the
United States Supreme Court found no constitutional bar to such ac-
tivity10 6 and the Alaska Supreme Court indicated in a prior case that
the testimony of an informant or undercover police officer actually
participating in a conversation with a suspect was admissible despite
the absence of a warrant, 10 7 the court in Glass held that the right to
privacy protected a suspect from warrantless recording of his
conversations. 108
The Glass court reached this result by applying the two-pronged
test laid out by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States. 10 9 No issue
in the possession of another government agency. This operated, according to the
court, to lower the privacy interest because others had already seen the records.
104. There may also be a private right of action implied here in favor of individuals
against credit reference organizations that make use of such personal information.
This action would be in the nature of a tort action, and exploration of this possibility is
beyond the scope of this note.
105. 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
106. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
107. Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1978).
108. Glass, 583 P.2d at 880.
109. 389 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., concurring). The two-part Harlan test had previ-
ously been adopted by the Alaska court for use in search and seizure cases in Smith v.
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was raised about the treatment of the first prong of the test. The court
assumed that Glass had exhibited an actual expectation that the con-
versation would not be recorded. The discussion in Glass focused on
the "reasonableness" of such an expectation. The court first noted
that the United States Supreme Court decision supporting such eaves-
dropping did not produce a majority opinion, 110 and that the Alaska
court was not bound by the Supreme Court's holding.11 The court
then distinguished the situation where a "false friend" actually testifies
concerning a conversation that he had with the accused.1 2 from the
introduction of recordings of that conversation surreptitiously made
with the cooperation of the "false friend." The court noted that the
expectation that one's confidential conversations would not be re-
peated by a friend is qualitatively different from the expectation that
the same conversation would not be recorded.113
Finally, the court stated that the Alaska privacy amendment "af-
fords broader protection than the penumbral right inferred from other
[federal and state] constitutional provisions. Were that not the case,
there would have been no need to amend the constitution."' 4 Based
on these principles, the Glass court held that the expectation that one's
conversations would not be recorded is reasonable within the meaning
of the Harlan test.15
The search and seizure cases following Glass have primarily been
concerned with the question of which expectations society is willing to
recognize as reasonable. In only a few cases has the court found that
the expectations of the persons involved were "reasonable" as defined
State, 510 P.2d 793, 797 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973). The two parts
of the test are laid out supra text accompanying note 36.
110. White, 401 U.S. at 745.
111. Glass, 583 P.2d at 876. The court reminded those reading the opinion that it
could construe the Alaska Constitution as providing rights additional to those
provided by the federal constitution. Id. n.12 (citing, among others, Zehrung v. State,
569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977), opinion on rehearing, 573 P.2d 858 (Alaska 1978), Woods
& Rohde, Inc. v. State Dep't. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977), and Blue v. State,
558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977)).
112. Glass, 583 P.2d at 880. An example of such a case is Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d
at 1064.
113. Glass, 583 P.2d at 876-78. The court quoted extensively from Judge Huf-
stedler's dissent in Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 72 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S.
1116 (1973). Judge Hufstedler stated that uninhibited discussion is an essential com-
ponent of a democratic society. While the risk of one's confidential conversations
being repeated can be just as inhibiting as the risk that the conversation is being re-
corded, the risk of recording is not one that society is willing to accept. Therefore, the
expectation that confidential conversations are not being recorded is reasonable. 486
F.2d at 72.
114. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879.
115. Id. at 880.
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in Glass, and the facts in these cases are all very similar to Glass. 116
Moreover, the court has held Glass inapplicable to any recordings of
conversations between citizens and uniformed officers when the con-
versation took place in the course of the officer's duty, either before1 17
or after118 an arrest. The protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures was interpreted by the court to cover searches by all gov-
ernmental officials, including agency employees. 1 9 The term "govern-
ment officials," however, was held not to apply to school authorities
conducting searches of students.1 20 In addition, fishermen were held
not to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in catches being stored
in their holds sufficient to protect them from searches by agency
officials.121
Glass, then, seems to have been the high-water mark for the pri-
vacy amendment's impact on the search and seizure area. In later
cases, the holding in Glass was limited to undercover operations and
the use of informants to record conversations. 122 Moreover, the Glass
decision is applicable to administrative searches, but the expectation of
privacy in these administrative cases involving commercial activity is
considered to be lower than that involved in criminal cases concerning
one's private conversations or activities in the home.123
IV. A UNIFIED PRIVACY ANALYSIS THROUGH THE SLIDING
SCALE TEST
The emergence of the sliding scale test in the general privacy area
leaves search and seizure the only privacy area in which the Alaska
Supreme Court has not begun to give the privacy amendment in-
dependent significance. By adopting the sliding scale test in the search
and seizure area, the ,court would provide greater protection for pri-
vacy rights than is currently available under the search and seizure
test. Adoption of the test also would give the privacy amendment the
116. See, eg., Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1978).
117. City of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984) (expectation that officer
conducting lawful stop or arrest would not record conversation not reasonable).
118. Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1979).
119. Schultz v. State, 593 P.2d 640, 642 (Alaska 1979) (fire inspector); see also
Woods & Rohde, Inc., 565 P.2d at 150 (OSHA inspector). In Schultz, the court held
that there was "a compelling need for official action, and no time to secure a warrant."
Thus, the invasion of privacy by the fire inspector was justified. 593 P.2d at 642.
120. D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
121. Dye v. State, 650 P.2d 418 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). In this case, the court
indicated its lack of reliance on the privacy amendment when it stated that the Katz
test, which it applied, was nothing more than a new definition of "search." Id. at 421.
This underscores the lack of any independent significance for the privacy amendment
in the search and seizure context.
122. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
123. Woods & Rohde, Inc., 565 P.2d at 150-51.
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independent significance which other privacy areas have given it.124
The sliding scale test also has the virtue of unifying the privacy
amendment analysis found in search and seizure cases with the analy-
sis emerging in general privacy areas. Moreover, use of the sliding
scale test would allow the court to remain consistent with current pre-
cedent and the realities of law enforcement.
A. Greater Protection for Privacy Rights
In Glass, the court used the two-pronged Harlan test to determine
both the privacy and the search and seizure issues presented. 125 This
test does not provide lasting protection to the right to privacy from
government encroachment because of its emphasis on reasonableness
as determined by society. Privacy is by definition a personal right,
which involves the right to exclude an activity from society's view.
Using society's expectations to define whether a given expectation of
privacy is protected at all is fundamentally inconsistent with the per-
sonal nature of the right. The balance that must be struck in privacy
cases is a balance between an individual's rights and society's rights.
If society's expectations are used to define what the individual's rights
are, the balance is bound to tilt in favor of society's interests.
Society's expectations do have a role to play in deciding to what
degree a given expectation of privacy will be protected under the slid-
ing scale test. They should not be used, however, to decide whether a
privacy interest should be recognized at all. If societal expectations
are used in determining which interests will be protected, privacy in-
terests will remain in a very precarious position. Only very strong
commonly held notions of privacy - like the privacy of the home or
the marital bedroom - will be accorded any lasting protection under
a societal reasonableness test. On the other hand, unpopular interests
- like the privacy of consenting homosexual adults - will receive no
protection if they are not generally recognized as "reasonable" by soci-
124. Privacy should be defined with respect to the fundamental "right to be let
alone" which all citizens enjoy. How much a citizen's exercise of that right conflicts
with similar rights of other citizens or the community at large should set the level of
justification required to overcome that right. This is the essence of the sliding scale
test. Where the interest at issue represents the core of the right to be let alone, as did
the privacy of the home involved in Ravin, the state should be required to show a
compelling interest to overcome that right. On the other hand, where the right to be
let alone is slight, the justification need only be a rational basis. Through the use of
consistent language, courts can assure that the privacy amendment will function as an
independent protection of rights for Alaskans, rather than merely an excuse for a
liberal interpretation of other constitutional guarantees.
125. The Harlan test was first adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in a case
decided less than one year after the passage of the privacy amendment. Smith v. State,
510 P.2d 793, 797 (Alaska), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
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ety. Changes in society's ideas of reasonable expectations might even
cause a protected personal right to privacy to vanish.126
It is more difficult to define privacy rights out of the privacy
amendment when a sliding scale test rather than a societal expecta-
tions test is employed by the court. Under the societal expectations
test the court may summarily deny any protection to a right. The
court simply states that society has not accepted the given expectation
of privacy as reasonable. Either a right is "reasonable" and protected
against infringement absent an important governmental interest or it is
"unreasonable" and totally unprotected. A sliding scale test, on the
other hand, proceeds from the assumption that all privacy rights are
protected to some degree. The sliding scale test avoids the either/or
analysis of the societal expectations test in favor of an analysis which
recognizes the existence of a middle ground between these poles of
reasonableness. It does not define privacy through societal standards
of reasonableness, but balances a challenged personal expectation
against society's expectations and other governmental interests. Of
course, the sliding scale test itself can be manipulated to give unpopu-
lar interests minimal protection, but the sliding scale has an advantage
over a reasonable expectations test in this regard. Even if judges de-
cide to provide only minimal protection to a privacy right, the right
would still be protected against arbitrary attacks. In contrast, a pri-
vacy right that the court labels as an unreasonable expectation receives
no protection from the privacy amendment at all.
126. The fragility of privacy rights under a reasonable expectations test is illus-
trated by the case in which the Harlan test was advanced, Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). Katz held that physical intrusion into protected space was not neces-
sary in order tq make out a fourth amendment violation. Id. at 352-53. In so doing,
the court overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Nevertheless, if
the two cases are analyzed under the Harlan test, the results are entirely consistent.
(This comparison was made in Comment, supra note 22, at 1457-61.) When Olmstead
was decided in 1928, society was not yet ready to recognize an expectation of privacy
in telephone use as reasonable. Very few people had telephones and societal expecta-
tions as to their use had not yet developed. By 1967, when Katz was decided, the
telephone had become part of daily life in America, and definite expectations of pri-
vacy could be said to have developed. Whereas in Katz the societal expectation had
developed in such a way as to provide increased protection for privacy, expectations
can also change in a way that provides less protection for privacy. An example of the
latter phenomenon is occurring in the area of electronic eavesdropping and informa-
tion gathering. As technology develops, it will become easier and easier for the gov-
ernment to eavesdrop; consequently, fewer and fewer places will be characterized as
places in which society would reasonably expect privacy. Other changes in society
may also reduce the number of places in which one would reasonably expect privacy.
An example of such a change is the replacement of the enclosed telephone booth. It is
an open question whether society would decide that the expectation of privacy in an
open booth, as opposed to the enclosed booth so important in Katz, is reasonable.
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B. Independent Significance and Uniformity across Areas
The sliding scale test seems to be emerging as the preferred form
of analysis in privacy jurisprudence. 127 Search and seizure remains the
main area in which the court has not adopted a separate privacy analy-
sis. The adoption of the sliding scale test in search and seizure cases
would, therefore, make search and seizure part of a uniform and in-
dependent privacy analysis. An independent privacy analysis focuses
squarely on the privacy issues involved and forces recognition of the
independent validity of the privacy amendment. The recognition of an
independent analysis requires the recognition of a separate exclusion-
ary rule specifically applicable to the privacy amendment. 128
A separate exclusionary rule would not only provide an in-
dependent analysis in the search and seizure area, it would provide
127. The emergence of the sliding scale test is discussed supra notes 80-104 and
accompanying text.
128. Prospects for an independently significant privacy amendment depend upon
convincing the supreme court to explicitly recognize an exclusionary rule based upon
the privacy amendment. Although Glass was decided based upon the right to privacy,
it did not explicitly hold that article I, section 22 provides a basis for excluding evi-
dence independent of the search and seizure provision. In fact, earlier in the same
year in which Glass was decided, the court had refused to recognize that any addi-
tional protection was provided by the privacy amendment in a search and seizure case.
Weltin v. State, 574 P.2d 816, 821 n.15 (Alaska 1978). That refusal was confined to
the facts of the case. The effect of the Glass decision on this language was not stated in
Glass itself. Subsequent to Glass, however, at least one Alaska appeals court has held
that there is no such independent exclusionary rule under the privacy amendment.
Wortham v. State, 641 P.2d 223, 224 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), affd after remand,
657 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). The supreme court affirmed the decision, but
did not reach the privacy issue. Wortham v. State, 666 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1983).
A strong argument can be made from the language in Glass itself that the Alaska
Supreme Court in fact recognized an independent exclusionary rule based on the pri-
vacy amendment in Glass. The court deviated from federal precedent in participant
monitoring of conversation because it believed the privacy amendment provided pro-
tection in addition to that provided by the fourth amendment and its Alaska counter-
part. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879. If the privacy amendment did not provide additional
protection, the court reasoned, there would have been no reason to amend the consti-
tution. Id. See also Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1979) (where the
court said that in Glass, "we held that the privacy amendment, Alaska Const., art. I,
§ 22, prohibited the electronic recording of a narcotics transaction.").
The Glass court, however, could have achieved the same result under pre-privacy
amendment precedent. The Alaska court had previously held that state rights could
provide greater protection than their federal counterparts. Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d
189, 199 (Alaska 1977). In fact, it is the duty of state courts to develop additional
rights. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970). If the privacy
amendment did not provide additional protection but merely served as an alternative
ground for accomplishing the same result attainable without the amendment, the in-
dependent significance of the privacy amendment is lost. The only way for the privacy
amendment to provide additional protection is by a separate exclusionary rule which
would focus the court's attention on privacy issues.
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more certain and adequate protection to privacy interests than Justice
Harlan's societal expectations test.129 The passage of the privacy
amendment meant that Alaska's courts would no longer have to rely
on penumbral privacy arguments. Use of the sliding scale test in
search and seizure cases, as well as in other contexts, makes the pas-
sage of the amendment meaningful and enables the courts to truly give
the privacy amendment "the life it deserves."' 130 More importantly,
the use of the sliding scale test will ensure that the right to privacy will
have equal meaning in all contexts, including the search and seizure
area.
C. Implications of the Sliding Scale Test
Once the operation of the sliding scale test is understood, one can
see that the test need not be applied in an ad hoc manner. Further-
more, the test will not require abandonment of whole areas of prece-
dent. If an aspect of the right to privacy is found to be fundamental,
then an important governmental interest is necessary to overcome the
right to privacy. In addition, the means of regulation or intrusion cho-
sen by the state would have to bear a "close and substantial relation-
ship" to the important governmental purpose.' 3 ' Whether or not a
right to privacy is fundamental would depend upon various factors,
such as the historic importance of the privacy interest, its relationship
to other fundamental rights, 132 and the impact of the exercise of the
right on other people and the public at large. 133 If the right being
exercised is not fundamental, a lesser governmental justification for
regulation or intrusion would be required to validate the state action,
even though the same factors could be examined in balancing the in-
terests involved.
The actual operation of the sliding scale test in the search and
seizure context would require a two-tiered analysis. 134 First, the court
would apply the search and seizure test of reasonable expectations. If
the search were illegal under this traditional search and seizure test,
129. See supra note 126, concerning the fragility of privacy interests under the soci-
etal expectations text.
130. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 23 (Alaska 1978) (Matthews, J., concurring).
131. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 498.
132. For example, "associational privacy" is necessary for the exercise of first
amendment rights in certain circumstances. See supra note 23.
133. The factors listed admittedly do not constitute a bright line. Nevertheless,
determining whether a right is a "fundamental" or lesser protected component of the
right of privacy is no more difficult than deciding whether or not a particular subjec-
tive expectation of privacy is recognized as "reasonable" by society at large.
134. A similar two-tiered analysis is advocated in Walinski & Tucker, Expectations
of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy through State Law, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 1 (1981).
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there would be no need for a privacy inquiry. If the search passed the
reasonable expectations test, a further privacy inquiry under the slid-
ing scale test would be necessary. Should the privacy interest be a
rather minor one, such as the right to use cocaine in a public place,
then the burden on the government to justify its intrusion would also
be minor. Thus, a legitimate interest in protecting the public by
preventing crime would almost always justify a warrantless search for
concealed cocaine if it were being used in a public place. 135 Under the
sliding scale test, however, as the privacy interest became stronger, the
burden on the government would increase.
Applying the sliding scale test to the search and seizure area
would not necessarily cause a wholesale reversal of precedent or great
problems for the policeman on the street. Since public safety, officer
safety, and the capture of criminals are legitimate state interests, many
searches by government officials would satisfy a requirement of an in-
creased state interest.136
The privacy analysis would have the greatest potential impact
where a "fundamental" right to privacy was found to be infringed. If
an aspect of privacy were deemed "fundamental," then any search in-
fringing on this right would be presumed unconstitutional, thereby re-
quiring justification by a showing of an important governmental
interest and the least intrusive means chosen to further that interest.
The important governmental interest would be balanced against the
fundamental privacy interests involved. The traditional exceptions to
the warrant requirement would generally satisfy this test, since in
these cases the governmental interest is heightened by the need to pro-
tect officers or to keep evidence from being destroyed.
If the results would be substantially the same under either the
sliding scale analysis or the traditional search and seizure test, why
employ a separate privacy test as a second tier of analysis at all? One
reason for employing the test is that the recognition of a distinction
between the aspects of privacy protected by the Harlan test and a slid-
ing scale test suggests that the results would not be the same under
both tests in all cases. 137 The Harlan test is primarily suited for cases
135. This ignores questions concerning the scope of the search.
136. There may also be cases, however, under the intermediate standard in which
the requirement that the police obtain a search warrant would impose so slight a bur-
den that warrantless searches would be invalid. An example of such a situation would
be a case involving warrantless wiretapping of a massage parlor, a place in which
patrons and employees have been held to have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1980). In such a case, if
some privacy interests were found to be infringed, a search could be invalidated if the
facts showed that there would have been no burden on the police in obtaining a search
warrant.
137. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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involving privacy of places. 138 A sliding scale test, on the other hand,
is used generally to provide a personal right to privacy. 39 Such per-
sonal rights stay with an individual no matter where that person goes.
Of course, personal privacy is often hard to define without reference to
a place,140 but where a right is defined without reference to a place, as
in Glass, the right can be protected from interference even in a place
where society is not willing to recognize an expectation of privacy as
"reasonable." 14 1
V. CONCLUSION
It has been thirteen years since the people of Alaska adopted arti-
cle 1, section 22 guaranteeing the right to privacy, and ten years since
the Alaska Supreme Court's first major decision in the area.1 42 In that
time, the courts have had ample opportunity to develop a unifying
rationale for the explicitly recognized right. The process is under way,
but it has proceeded slowly. The judicial development, relying on a
case-by-case analysis, lacks consistency. As a consequence, the con-
tours of the right, including exactly what is meant by the term "pri-
vacy," have not yet been fully defined. The courts have not used the
privacy amendment to extend additional protection to individuals
138. Justice Harlan himself recognized the difference between applying his test to
place privacy interests and applying it to personal privacy rights. While the majority
noted that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," Katz, 389 U.S. at
351, Harlan based his concurrence on the fact that a phone booth is a constitutionally
protected area, not the fact that there was any reasonable expectation of privacy in the
conversation itself. Id. at 360.
139. This distinction provides a basis for recharacterizing the holding in Glass.
Glass was decided without reference to place, but with a recognition of the fundamen-
tal right to privacy in intimate conversations which is necessary for full and free dis-
cussion in a democratic society. This is indicated by the Glass court's extensive quote
from Judge Hufstedler's dissent in Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). Glass, 583 P.2d at 876-78. See supra note 113.
140. The difficulty of defining personal privacy without reference to a place is illus-
trated by Ravin, 537 P.2d 494. The court based the holding on the place privacy of
the home. The personal privacy right to ingest substances was not sufficient by itself
to overcome the state's interests. Id. at 511.
141. A good example of the difference that recognition of fundamental privacy
rights would make is People v. Crowson, 33 Cal. 3d 623, 660 P.2d 389, 165 Cal. Rptr.
165 (1983). In that case, two suspects were left alone in the back seat of a police car.
While they were alone they talked to each other, making some incriminating state-
ments. Their conversation was surreptitiously recorded, and the remarks introduced
into evidence against them. The introduction of the remarks was upheld because
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations held in a police car,
even with no police officer present.
If Glass were recharacterized as suggested above, supra note 139, the fundamen-
tal right of intimate conversation would protect such conversations, even though the
expectation of privacy in that place was not reasonable.
142. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 494.
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against the increasing threats to privacy posed by the demands of the
Information Age in which Alaskans now live.143 What is needed is a
judicial commitment to the independent significance of a separate pri-
vacy guarantee. This could be achieved by judicial inquiry into the
full textual implications of the privacy amendment. Cases like Ravin
v. State and State v. Glass indicate such a willingness on the part of the
Alaska Supreme Court. Recognition of a truly independent privacy
amendment, however, also requires consistent analysis in order for a
comprehensive form of protection to be developed. The sliding scale
test provides the vehicle for the attainment of comprehensiveness and
consistency in the construction of the privacy amendment. Moreover,
the test allows for flexibility in confronting any threats to privacy
which may emerge in the future.
John F. Grossbauer
143. See supra note 5.
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